Showing posts with label jurisdiction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jurisdiction. Show all posts

Monday, October 12, 2009

Matter of Biebl - Recognition of foreign divorces - Litvaitis v. Litvaitis

Interim Decision #2672

Matter of Biebl

In Visa Petition Proceedings
A-21041737
Decided by Board September 13, 1978

(1) Under law of Connecticut at least one of the spouses must establish a domicile in the jurisdiction in which a foreign divorce decree is sought in order to give a court jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 295 A.2d 519 (1972).
(2) Under law of Connecticut, for purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of a court to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage, "domicile" is that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, unless or until something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home, Spaulding v. Spaulding, 177 Conn. 220, 368 A.2d 14 (1976).
(3) Where petitioner and his first spouse were domiciled in New York at the time they
obtained a divorce decree in the Dominican Republic according to the Dominican Republic law, dissolution of prior marriage not recognized for immediate relative
benefits under section 201(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b); hence, a second marriage; in Connecticut, will not support a visa petition.

ON BEHALF OF PBTmONER: Joseph Abrams, Esquire
Abrams and Abrams
One Perm Plaza
New York, New York 10001
BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Appleman, Maguire, and Farb, Board Members

The United States citizen petitioner submitted on November 28, 1977, Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant Visa on behalf of his stepdaughter under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b), In his decision dated April 25, 1978, the Acting District Director denied the petition. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner, a 57-year-old male, married the beneficiary's mother in Connecticut on November 5, 1977. The 15-year-old beneficiary is a native and citizen of Germany, born on September 6, 1963.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of establishing the claimed, relationship is upon the petitioner. Matter of Brantigan, 111. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). In order to qualify as a "stepchild" the beneficiary must also have qualified as the "child" of the petitioner under section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1). Nazareno v. Attorney General, 512 F.2d 936 (D.C, Cir. 1975), cert,
denied, 432 U.S. 832 (1975).

The only subdivision of section 101(b)(1) which may possibly be relevant to this case is (E) which provides:
(1) The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is—
(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock^ provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of
stepchild occurred; ....
The marriage between the petitioner and the beneficiary's mother which took place in Connecticut on November 5, 1977, is the second marriage for each. The first marriage of the beneficiary's mother was dissolved on July 11,1972, in Germany. The dissolution of that marriage is not in question.

The petitioner's first marriage was dissolved on May 23, 1977, in the Dominican Republic. Contained in the record is a certificate of the Court of First Instance of Judicial District of Santo Dominican showing: that Guenther L. Kuehl personally appeared before that Court; that Gisela Kuehl appeared before that court by her attorney in fact; that both parties were domiciled at 507 Crotón Avenue, Peekskill, New York.
The validity Of a marriage generally is determined according to the law of the place of celebration. Matter of Gomero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 674 (BIA 1974); Matter of Levine, 131. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of P—, 4 L & N. Dee. 610 (BIA 1952, A.G. 1952). Thus, the validity of the petitioner's present marriage to the beneficiary's mother depends upon whether Connecticut would recognize the Dominican Republic divorce decree purportedly terminating the petitioner's prior marriage.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that at least one of the spouses must establish a domicile in the jurisdiction in which a foreign divorce decree is sought in order to give a court jurisdiction to grant a divorce; that principle has been held to apply to divorce decrees granted in foreign jurisdictions, even though a domicile is not required by the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540,295 A.2d 519 (1972).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held, for purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of a court to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage, "domicile" is that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, unless or until something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home. Spaulding v. Spaulding, 171 Conn. 220,
368 A.2d 14 (1976).

Inasmuch as the certified Dominican Republic divorce decree contained in the record shows that both the petitioner and his first spouse were domiciled in New York on May 23,1977, neither spouse has met the domiciliary requirement set out in Connecticut law. The petitioner's divorce is not entitled to recognition under Connecticut law. See Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, supra; Spaulding v. Spaulding, supra.

Accordingly, as the petitioner's prior marriage was not dissolved as a result of the decree rendered on May 23, 1977, the petitioner was not free to marry the beneficiary's mother on November 5, 1977. Consequently, the "stepchild" relationship for immigration purposes was not established between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The decision of the Acting District Director was correct. Accordingly,
the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

Saturday, October 3, 2009

FRISBIE v. COLLINS, 342 U.S. 519 - Ker-Frisbie Doctrine

Reaffirmed holding of Ker v. Illinois, 199 U.S. 436 (1886),

"power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."

342 U.S. 519

72 S.Ct. 509

96 L.Ed. 541

FRISBIE
v.
COLLINS.

No. 331.

Argued Jan. 28, 1952.

Decided March 10, 1952.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1952.

See 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 768.

Mr. Edmund E. Shepherd, Lansing, Mich., for petitioner.

Mr. A. Stewart Kerr, Detroit, Mich., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
1

Acting as his own lawyer,1 the respondent Shirley Collins brought this habeas corpus case in a United States District Court seeking release from a Michigan state prison where he is serving a life sentence for murder. His petition alleges that while he was living in Chicago, Michigan officers forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to Michigan. He claims that trial and conviction under such circumstances is in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Kidnaping Act,2 and that therefore his conviction is a nullity.
2

The District Court denied the writ without a hearing on the ground that the state court had power to try respondent 'regardless of how presence was procured.' The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded the cause for hearing. 6 Cir., 189 F.2d 464. It held that the Federal Kidnaping Act had changed the rule declared in prior holdings of this Court, that a state could constitutionally try and convict a defendant after acquiring jurisdiction by force.3 To review this important question we granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 865, 72 S.Ct. 112.
3

We must first dispose of the state's contention that the District Court should have denied relief on the ground that respondent had an available state remedy. This argument of the state is a little cloudy, apparently because of the state attorney general's doubt that any state procedure used could possibly lead to the granting of relief. There is no doubt that as a general rule federal courts should deny the writ to state prisoners if there is 'available State corrective process'. 62 Stat. 967, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254.4 As explained in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210, 70 S.Ct. 587, 593, 94 L.Ed. 761, this general rule is not rigid and inflexible; district courts may deviate from it and grant relief in special circumstances. Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual appraisal by the court in each special situation. Determination of this issue, like others, is largely left to the trial courts subject to appropriate review by the courts of appeals.
4

The trial court, pointing out that the Michigan Supreme Court had previously denied relief, apparently assumed that no further state corrective process was available5 and decided against respondent on the merits. Failure to discuss the availability of state relief may have been due to the fact that the state did not raise the question; indeed the record shows no appearance of the state.6 The Court of Appeals did expressly consider the question exhaustion of state remedies. It found the existence of 'special circumstances' which required prompt federal intervention 'in this case.' It would serve no useful purpose to review those special circumstances in detail. They are peculiar to this case, may never come up again, and a discussion of them could not give precision to the 'special circumstances' rule. It is sufficient to say that there are sound arguments to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that prompt decision of the issues raised was desirable. We accept its findings in this respect.
5

This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S.Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.Ed. 421, that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.'7 No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will.
6

Despite our prior decisions, the Court of Appeals, relying on the Federal Kidnaping Act, held that respondent was entitled to the writ if he could prove the facts he alleged. The Court thought that to hold otherwise after the passage of the Kidnaping Act 'would in practical effect lend encouragement to the commission of criminal acts by those sworn to enforce the law.' (189 F.2d 468) In considering whether the law of our prior cases has been changed by the Federal Kidnaping Act, we assume, without intimating that it is so, that the Michigan officers would have violated it if the facts are as alleged. This Act prescribes in some detail the severe sanctions Congress wanted it to have. Persons who have violated it can be imprisoned for a term of years or for life; under some circumstances violators can be given the death sentence. We think the Act cannot fairly be construed so as to add to the list of sanctions detailed a sanction barring a state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to it by its officers. It may be that Congress could add such a sanction.8 We cannot.
7

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed.
8

It is so ordered.
9

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed.
1

We appointed counsel to represent respondent in this Court. 342 U.S. 892, 72 S.Ct. 199.
2

47 Stat. 326, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201.
3

Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 8 S.Ct. 1204, 32 L.Ed. 283. See also Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549; In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 17 S.Ct. 735, 42 L.Ed. 103.
4

'An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. (Emphasis added.)

'An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.'
5

The Court said, 'Petitioner originally filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan which was denied on June 22, 1949. He then filed a petition for a iwrit in this District, on the ground that the complaint in the state court action was defective and that a faulty warrant was issued for his arrest, claiming further that he was kidnapped by Michigan Police authorities in Chicago, Illinois, and brought to Michigan for trial. This petition was also denied.'
6

So far as the record shows, the state's first objection to federal court consideration of this case was made after the Court of Appeals decided in respondent's favor. A motion for rehearing then filed alleged that respondent had made several futile efforts to have his conviction reviewed. The motion also denied that the particular ground here relied on had previously been raised.
7

See cases cited, supra, note 2.
8

Cf. Mahon v. Justice, supra, n. 3, 127 U.S. 705, 8 S.Ct. 1207.

Saturday, November 22, 2008

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ANALIEFO ANTHONY OKOLOJI, : 3:07cv24(WWE)
Petitioner, ::
v. :
:
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al., :
Respondents. :

RULING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

The petitioner, Analiefo Anthony Okoloji, has brought a petition for mandamus seeking to compel adjudication of his application for citizenship. Respondents assert that the action is moot since petitioner’s application has now been adjudicated. For the following reasons, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied.


BACKGROUND


On May 23, 2005, petitioner filed a Form N-400 application for citizenship. On October 31, 2005, petitioner was interviewed by a District Adjudication Officer concerning his eligibility for naturalization. On December 9, 2005, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) denied the petitioner’s N-400 application on the basis of petitioner’s unpaid taxes.

On January 5, 2006, petitioner filed a Request for a N-336 Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization Proceedings. On May 19, 2006, petitioner attended a hearing on his N-336 application, at which time he was requested to provide further information. Petitioner submitted that requested information.

On January 5, 2007, petitioner filed this complaint for mandamus relief,requesting this Court to compel the respondents to adjudicate the petitioner’s Form N-400 and Form N-366 applications.

In February 2007, respondents sent petitioner a decision on his Form N-366 request for a hearing, adhering to its previous decision to deny his N-400 application for naturalization.

The decision stated:
Information submitted by you indicated that you set up a payment plan in 2003 to address the issue of these overdue taxes. While the information you submitted overcomes the allegation that back taxes were not fully addressed until 2005, it still does not indicate that the debts from 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax years were addressed timely. A review of the tax transcripts that you submitted reveals that on July 19, 2003, an “Intent to Levy Collection Due Process Notice” was issued to you. This notice was issued as a result of your failure to timely pay taxes that were owed from previous tax years. Furthermore, the tax transcripts submitted throughout the statutory period reflect that you were subject to several “failure to pay” tax penalties. Failure to pay owed taxes is an unlawful act that adversely reflects upon your moral character.

In light of the lack of evidence concerning any extenuating circumstances that would have caused petitioner’s failure to pay taxes timely, the USCIS found that plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof to establish good moral character during the statutorily prescribed period.

DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks judicial determination of his naturalization application and a declaration that he is entitled to be naturalized. He argues that this Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and should disregard respondents’ decision. The Court assumes for purposes of this ruling that petitioner’s reliance on §1447(b) is proper.

Petitioner has brought this mandamus action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b),
which provides, in relevant part1:
If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instruction, to the service to determine the matter.

Respondents set forth that the case is moot since petitioner’s application has been adjudicated. When a case is moot, this Court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction due to the lack of case or controversy. Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner’s argument in favor of this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction relies upon United State v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2004). Hovespian held that once a petitioner has filed a complaint pursuant to section 1447(b), the district court retains exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, a subsequent decision of USCIS adjudicating a petitioner’s application does not render the case moot. Id. at 1164. However, recent decisions have held that the district court and USCIS hold concurrent jurisdiction over the matter after § 1447 (b) is invoked. Al-Saleh v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 990145 (D.Utah 2007); Perry v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 293424 (D.N.J. 2007).

In this instance, denial of the mandamus petition is appropriate according to either view of § 1447(b)’s effect. If concurrent jurisdiction exists, the Court finds that the case has been adjudicated and is therefore moot. If exclusive jurisdiction is proper, petitioner has not provided this Court with any legal or evidentiary ground to find differently from the USCIS’ decision on the merits.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for mandamus relief is DENIED. The
clerk is instructed to close this case.

Dated this 25th day of June, 2007, in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
_____________/s/_____________________
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE